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Abstract. In recent years, wireless technologies are increasingly adopted
in many application domains that were either unconnected before or ex-
clusively used cable networks. This paradigm shift towards – often ad-
hoc – wireless communication has led to significant benefits in terms
of flexibility and mobility. Alongside with these benefits, however, arise
new attack vectors, which cannot be mitigated by traditional security
measures. Hence, mechanisms that are orthogonal to cryptographic se-
curity techniques are necessary in order to detect adversaries. In tradi-
tional networks, such mechanisms are subsumed under the term “intru-
sion detection system,” and many proposals have been implemented for
different application domains. More recently, the term “misbehavior de-
tection” has been coined to encompass detection mechanisms especially
for attacks in wireless networks. In this paper, we use industrial wireless
networks as an exemplary application domain to discuss new directions
and future challenges in detecting insider attacks. To that end, we re-
view existing work on intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc networks.
We focus on physical-layer-based detection mechanisms as these are a
particularly interesting research direction that had not been reasonable
before widespread use of wireless technology.
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1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems, such as, power plants, intelligent transportation sys-
tems, connected cars, or industrial automation systems, were traditionally
mostly autonomous. As their connectivity increases, a constant threat arises
by both insider and outsider adversaries with varying motivations. One source
of motivation is industrial espionage, where a competitor tries to obtain se-
cret intellectual property in order to void a technological advantage. Also, acts
of sabotage in the name of national security have been observed. Famously, the
Stuxnet virus [1] presumably targeted nuclear facilities in Iran. Attacks on cyber-
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physical systems may lead to severe disadvantages for companies, and they may
even endanger lives.
Importantly, most attacks on industrial communication are mounted from
within the network. As recent attack examples demonstrate, adversaries often in-
filtrate their target systems and then act as insiders, using compromised systems
within the network’s trusted perimeter. Therefore, additional layers of defense
are necessary when cryptographic protection, like encryption and signatures, are
compromised. Mechanisms are required that inspect messages and message se-
quences in order to ensure their plausibility and consistency. These mechanisms
are usually subsumed under the term Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In in-
dustrial networks, such systems are important to detect active insider attacks.
As existing general-purpose IDS cannot simply be converted for use in indus-
trial settings, researchers have made tailored proposals that include application
semantics (e. g., [2]–[4]). These proposals typically apply to wired industrial com-
munication architectures, such as the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system.
Whereas these example attacks and tailored IDS target traditional IT infras-
tructure that is mostly wired, recent advances in wireless technology have led
to a pervasive adoption of wireless systems – including their use for industrial
communication. Depending on the use case, the industrial communication net-
works’ structure differs widely between closed-loop systems and ad-hoc topolo-
gies. Common to all applications are tight resource constraints, for example, on
the latency or expected throughput.
Fundamentally, the shift towards wireless connectivity opens up new attack
vectors due to the wireless medium’s broadcast nature. Eavesdropping and jam-
ming of packets, for instance, are simplified significantly. Moreover, with in-
creased flexibility, industrial communication systems become more complex and
require more maintenance. This additional maintenance extends the risk of inside
adversaries, such as disguised IT-maintenance personnel. To counteract these
novel attack forms, the term “misbehavior detection” emerged, which can be
seen as a subform of IDS for wireless systems [5]–[7]. Example mechanisms for
misbehavior detection are two-step ACKs [8], monitoring watchdogs [9] and au-
tomatic feature correlation [10]. These approaches, however, may not always be
suited for particular situations. For example, due to resource constraints, misbe-
havior detection in industrial wireless communication systems is challenging and
closely related to existing approaches for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). In-
stead, lightweight misbehavior detection based on physical-layer characteristics
can be used. These physical-layer characteristics depend on the sender’s loca-
tion and are, in contrast to the communication’s content, not spoofable by an
adversary. Misbehavior detection mechanisms can leverage these channel charac-
teristics for adversary detection – a practice located in the field of physical-layer
security. In particular, lightweight security based on physical-layer properties is
well-suited for this task.
Therefore, in this paper, we discuss the potential and challenges of misbe-
havior detection mechanisms in industrial wireless communication. We elaborate
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on these challenges (Section 2) before turning to existing approaches for attack
detection algorithms in MANETs in Section 3. In particular, we state their
assumptions and limitations and discuss whether ideas can be transferred indus-
trial wireless use cases. We identify the challenge of trusted information dissem-
ination in multi-hop networks with potential adversaries, which we investigate
in Section 4 alongside with suggestions for possible solutions. We summarize
pointers for future research and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Challenges of industrial misbehavior detection
Due to new attack vectors, the development of misbehavior detection frame-
works for emerging industrial networks is important to add an additional layer
of security to these systems. Traditional wired industrial automation systems
and emerging – more general and flexible – wireless systems are fundamentally
different. Therefore, existing IDS techniques cannot easily be transferred to the
new use case, necessitating novel mechanisms.
Challenges arise due to the variety of different application scenarios and in-
dustrial wireless networks’ contradictory requirements. On the one hand, use
cases in industrial wireless networks range from closed-loop systems with low
latency and low packet error rate, to multi-hop information propagation from
sensors to data sinks. These applications differ not only in their respective sce-
nario but also in requirements and communication characteristics. In closed-loop
systems, for example, communication is synchronized and optimized for maxi-
mum throughput and minimal packet error rate, while not providing flexibility in
terms of joining/parting nodes. Multi-hop information propagation, as the other
extreme, is flexible in the topology and can easily tolerate packet errors but can-
not achieve minimal delay. Hence, the challenge when developing misbehavior
detection techniques is to not only cope with these differences but rather lever-
age these characteristics. Domain-specific properties should be used to develop
tailored mechanisms for each use case in order to achieve maximal detection per-
formance and security. On the other hand, contradictory requirements regarding
the properties of industrial wireless networks lead to additional challenges in
the design of misbehavior detection systems. Closed-loop, low-latency wireless
networks, for example, aim at achieving wire-equivalent performance while pro-
viding more security than traditional wire-based systems. Hence, the security
mechanisms must be as lightweight as possible but still maintain a high security
standard – a tradeoff that has to be accounted for in the development of suitable
misbehavior detection approaches. Thus, the challenge when designing these ap-
proaches lies in this tradeoff and finding the equilibrium between performance
and security.
Therefore, lightweight misbehavior detection systems are necessary, which
inflict as little resource usage as possible while still maintaining a sufficient level
of security. Particularly promising approaches for this task are passive physical-
layer security mechanisms, which monitor the communication and only send mes-
sages in the presence of suspicious activities. The resource-friendly availability
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of these channel measurements makes them well suited for resource-constrained
networks, such as, industrial automation systems or MANETs. Passive physical-
layer security has been employed for misbehavior detection in MANETs, espe-
cially for Sybil attack detection [11]–[13] and classical intrusion detection [14],
[15]. Two questions arise: can these techniques be transferred from MANETs to
industrial communication systems? And, what are the potential limitations and
future research directions?
3 New challenges – old solutions?
In the following, we discuss existing physical-layer approaches for MANETs and
their applicability to industrial wireless networks. Physical-layer security lever-
ages physical properties to enhance security, which involves diverse topics such
as distance bounding [16], key derivation [17], node authentication [18], and in-
trusion detection [19]. We distinguish between active and passive mechanisms:
active physical-layer security algorithms require additional actions, such as, a
challenge-response communication in distance bounding. Passive mechanisms,
in contrast, simply monitor the desired physical properties of the communica-
tion channel between the monitoring node and the sender. The channel between
sender and receiver determines how wireless signals are altered by the environ-
ment through, for instance, reflections and diffractions. Due to these environ-
mental effects, each location is unique in terms of how the signal arrives at the
receiver [20]. Moreover, the pairwise channel between sender and receiver cannot
be estimated through eavesdropping at different locations and is, therefore, con-
sidered a shared secret [17]. The channel properties are estimated by the receiver
at the beginning of each transmission sequence; hence, these measurements are
readily available without inducing additional network load – a significant advan-
tage over traditional cryptographic methods.
The applicability of some existing works is hindered by strong assumptions
on the attacker or the network in general. Newsome et al. [12], for example, pro-
pose a radio resources testing scheme based on dividing the frequency band into
subchannels for each neighbor. Under the assumption that the attacker radio can
only listen and send on a single frequency, Sybil nodes will be detected. Besides
the limitation in network bandwidth, an attacker may use multiple antennas
to circumvent this mechanism. Similarly, in [21], [22], a low-mobility network is
assumed, which is not generally the case for industrial communication systems.
In their seminal work, Demirbas et al. [23] propose a detection mechanism
based on Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) measurements. Their work is
an implementation of [24], where a framework of four collaborating honest nodes
is used to locate a node. It is proven that no node can hide its position when
monitored by four honest nodes. The authors point out that exactly locating
a node is not necessary in order to detect Sybil attacks; instead, it suffices to
process the measured RSSI values directly. The approach is applicable in general
scenarios, though in both works, the problem of information dissemination and
selection of honest nodes is not tackled.
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Sybil detection using RSSI measurements has subsequently been adopted in
a number of works [21], [22], [25], [26]. These approaches, however, are based
on strong assumptions regarding the mobility in the network or the attacker’s
capabilities. In [22], for example, it is assumed that the attacker cannot control
transmission power, whereas Wang et al. [25] assume no mobility in the network.
Although Wang et al.’s assumptions do not hold in industrial communication
systems, the proposed hierarchical approach to Sybil detection is insightful and
can be easily transferred to other application domains. Information is shared by
flooding, which is robust but suffers from low performance.
An analytical justification of Sybil detection via channel measurements is
given by Xiao et al. [20], who theoretically analyze the Channel Impulse Response
(CIR). It is shown that the CIR quickly de-correlates with distance. Based on
this theoretical analysis, a hypothesis test – Sybil attacker present or not – is
proposed. The necessary parameters for this hypothesis test are derived from
the theoretical model. Chen et al. [27], [28] extend this theoretical treatment to
Received Signal Strength. The conducted analysis provides valuable insights not
only for MANETs but also for other application domains. The attacker detection
in [18], [20], [29], [30] is based on hypothesis testing of only the last measurement,
which may not be enough if large channel fluctuations occur. Subsequent works
are based on a k-means cluster analysis by maintaining a sliding window of past
measurements, which is more suitable for the industrial use case. Again, when
measurements from multiple nodes are combined, the focus lies on the detection
algorithm rather than information dissemination.
The field of secure localization is also closely related to the detection of Sybil
attacks, since an attacker cannot forge multiple fake identities if each network
node can be localized. Localization techniques that were not designed with an
adversarial setting in mind, however, suffer shortcomings and potential security
weaknesses in the presence of an attacker [31], [32]. Hence, secure localization
approaches can either cope with attacker-injected outliers [33] or use unforgeable
physical properties to make attacks impossible [32]. Thwarting attacks by making
algorithms more robust is a promising idea but a difficult task and requires
careful consideration of the use case and attacker model at hand, thus providing
interesting research challenges. In general, since secure localization schemes are
oftentimes based on active measurements [32], [34], they are not particularly well
suited for enhancing the security in industrial wireless networks.
Passive physical-layer techniques based on channel properties are not only
employed for Sybil detection, but also for misbehavior detection in general. In
fact, in an IDS, the detection of Sybil attacks and impersonation attacks is one
of many monitoring tasks. In these wireless intrusion detection systems, passive
physical-layer security techniques are used as one possible source of informa-
tion [14], [15]. A key observation of wireless intrusion detection systems is that
a single metric is not enough for adequate attacker detection. When detecting
jammers, for example, Xu et al. have shown that with a single metric, such as
RSSI, not all potential jamming strategies can be detected [35], [36]. Instead,
the authors propose a combination of different indicators, such as RSSI, packet
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delivery ratio, and node location, to detect and mitigate jamming attacks. The
combination significantly improves the detection performance, an observation
that applies to other use cases, as well [9], [32], [37]. Hence, relying on a single
metric for intrusion detection is not enough, instead one has to take into account
all available information.
4 New solutions are necessary
As we have seen, a number of channel-based physical-layer security approaches
for MANETs exist. Most of these ideas require additional research to transform
existing knowledge into misbehavior detection techniques in industrial wireless
networks. A promising general idea is to leverage the wireless medium’s broad-
cast nature by aggregating data from multiple nodes for improved detection
accuracy. Common to all algorithms that rely on multiple cooperating nodes or
distributed measurements is the challenge of information dissemination. Espe-
cially in an adversarial setting, trusted communication among the monitoring
nodes is a vital aspect of these algorithms.
Depending on the attacker model, this problem may be easily solvable with
traditional cryptographic mechanisms. If we, however, assume an inside attacker
with access to key material, as motivated in Section 1, authenticity and integrity
cannot be guaranteed anymore. Attackers could easily jam the communication
of an honest node [38] and inject their own data instead. These challenges have
been investigated separately in great detail and suitable solutions have been
proposed for the individual aspects: cryptographic mechanisms at least ensure
authenticity as well as integrity, jamming can be detected in many cases [35], and
cloned/overtaken nodes can be detected [39], [40]. However, individual solutions
assume different attacker models and thus can not necessarily be combined.
In the end, given an attacker with the ability to inject/jam packets, dis-
tributed information sharing is closely related to the notion of trust. Trust can
be node-centric or data-centric, i.e., to which degree the bearer of information
is trusted and how plausible the data is. Especially in multi-hop networks in the
presence of an attacker, the trust in a certain data item quickly decreases in the
number of hops between sender and receiver. In particular, the trust in received
information depends on both, the data itself, as well as the nodes traversed on
the routing path. When designing distributed algorithms, these complex trust
relationships should therefore explicitly be taken into account in order to make
the system more resilient against attacks.
While the notion of trust is intuitive to most, several questions arise in the
context of communication networks: How to quantify and compute trust? How
to include trust into, e.g., routing and attacker detection decisions? How to deal
with inconsistent “trust views” or opinions between the nodes? Most Sybil at-
tack detection algorithms are based on statistical methods, such as hypothesis
testing [18], [20], [29], [30] or machine learning algorithms [27]. Hence, their out-
put is not binary but probabilistic. Although this output could serve as the basis
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for trust derivation, it is not trivial to cope with statistical outliers nor to nor-
malize the resulting values. Optimally, the trust should depend on the situation
rather than the underlying algorithm; thus, some sort of output normalization
is necessary. Additionally, the data should contribute to the trust computation
as well. Hence, every node must have some model, theoretical or empirical, for
each neighbor, specifying the expected range of data. Since the nodes are often
resource constrained, one has to face a tradeoff between accuracy and cost of
these models. Moreover, the transitive computation of trust over multiple hops
is a difficult challenge. If a node does not trust a direct neighbor, any infor-
mation transferred via that neighbor is questionable. One is tempted to simply
dismiss these transitive relationships and focus on the direct neighbors instead,
which would, however, give an attacker an easy leverage to disturb the network.
Last but not least, computing trust for more than just immediate neighbors is a
difficult task: one has to design suitable metrics and is still facing the problem
of obtaining reliable information on multi-hop neighbors.
Including computed trust values into routing and attacker detection deci-
sions poses another challenge. When incorporating data from multiple sources
in distributed algorithms, the trust in each particular source should influence
the decision. In attack detection, for example, one could weigh each received
(and missing) data item according to the computed trust associated with that
packet. However, again, an attacker could exploit that mechanism to alter the
decisions of the detection algorithm by decreasing the trust in honest nodes. A
possible remedy is the development of robust algorithms [33], which are able to
deal with or even detect intentional outliers. When every node maintains its own
trust view on the network, inconsistencies can arise, which could cause difficul-
ties when nodes are to agree on a consensus in a distributed fashion. Naturally,
the trust has to be taken into account in this process. In situations without
trust, this is normally achieved by Byzantine commitment protocols [41]. The
combination of trust values for each packet, together with traditional Byzantine
commitment protocols and the establishment of fundamental bounds on this
procedure, are also a challenging research question.
A potential method to formally capture trust relationships in general is sub-
jective logic [42]. Subjective logic is a powerful and flexible framework for reason-
ing under uncertainty, in which facts or measurements are extended to opinions
in order to incorporate said uncertainty. It provides notions for data-centric trust
and node-centric trust, as well as operators to combine opinions, which can be
used to model trust relationships. In particular, subjective logic provides several
operators in order to reduce trust chains to a single logical opinion. The choice
of operators depends on the setting at hand and requires careful consideration.
5 Concluding outlook on future research
In this paper we discussed the challenges of misbehavior detection in industrial
wireless networks. These challenges arise in multiple aspects, from jamming de-
tection and prevention to malicious packet injection; hence, a holistic perspective
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is required to design suitable solutions. Although it is reasonable to focus on a
particular aspect in research, a heterogeneous landscape of different assumptions
and models makes it difficult to combine individual ideas. We believe that a har-
monization of models is necessary so that the design of a complex systems from
individual parts is facilitated.
As we have seen in Section 3, physical-layer information, which is readily
available without any additional cost, has been successfully leveraged for attacker
detection. Due to firmware constraints in commercial off-the-shelf hardware, of-
ten only coarse-grained information, such as RSSI, is reported to higher layers.
However, more fine-grained CIR information is available, which would signifi-
cantly increase the performance of detection algorithms [43]. Thus, in our view,
the development of suitable firmwares capable of providing more information is
an important step towards future solutions.
Last but not least, we discussed information dissemination in adversarial
multi-hop environments. We propose to include the notion of trust into algo-
rithms and protocols in order to dependably spread information. Possible direc-
tions for future research include (1) the computation of the trust itself, especially
over multiple hops, (2) the incorporation of trust into existing protocols, and (3)
trust-based distributed consensus.
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